The Financial Crisis of 2008: 
What needs to happen after TARP

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Abstract

The Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) is an insufficient policy initiative to end the current credit crisis. The measures that I propose below call for a fundamentally different approach to dealing with troubled assets, the recapitalization of the FDIC and moves to reduce bank runs, mechanisms that the Federal Reserve and Treasury need to put in place to deal with the inevitable surge in bank failures, and a proposal for a Bank Capitalization Fund that would jump start our credit system. So far, policy makers have reacted to one crisis after another. My proposals are proactive.

Current Situation

Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), whether it passes Congress or not, is an insufficient step to deal with our current credit crisis. The real economy depends on well-functioning capital markets, money markets, and banking system. Since early 2007, the capital markets, especially debt markets, have been under the greatest stress in 75 years. We have seen the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history† – Lehman Brothers, the largest bank failure in U.S. history,‡ Washington Mutual, and the end of the road for the traditional Wall Street investment banks. Despite huge injections by the central banks in the U.S. and abroad, the

† While their have been bigger bankruptcies, a good comparable is the failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990. At that time, Drexel’s assets were $3.5 billion which is $6 billion in 2008 dollars. Lehman’s assets were $639 billion.

‡ Continental Illinois failed in 1984 had $40 billion in assets which is $85 billion in 2008 dollars. Washington Mutual has $307 billion in assets. Note IndyMac had $32 billion in assets.
money markets have come under severe pressure, driven by fears of counterparty risk.

While most of the focus has been on Wall Street, there are hundreds, if not a thousand banks, that may be insolvent if their assets, which include capital market instruments, were marked-to-market. Over the next six months, we are faced with the specter of a massive number of bank failures. Although the TARP is essential right now, we have several other major issues to address in the capital markets, money markets, and banking system.

Some historical perspective is important here. During the 1929-33 period, there were over 9,000 bank failures. The deposit base of the failed institutions was $7.1 billion or $90.4 billion in 2008 dollars. Washington Mutual had a deposit base of $188.3 billion as of June 30, 2008.

The Resolution Trust Corporation was initiated in 1989. Initially it was assigned approximately $125 billion in assets of almost 300 failed S&Ls. They added about $400 billion over a six year period from other institutions that were insolvent. Hence, the total assets targeted for disposal were $550 billion over this period which is roughly $900 billion in 2008 dollars.

Today’s situation is larger in scale than the S&L crisis. The combined assets of just two firms, Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, $946 billion, exceeds the assets targeted during the S&L crisis.

Note the total assets of Wachovia Corporation were $812 billion as of June 30, 2008. National City’s assets were $153 billion as of the same date.

It is naïve to think that the $700 billion TARP program will solve our financial crisis. In addition, there are some serious flaws with the current TARP proposal. We need to get out ahead.

Today’s crisis has two other dimensions. First, the so called ‘deleveraging’ is not just coming from Wall Street investment banks. Even healthy banks are selling assets because almost all assets have become more risky and their risk management systems are telling them to switch into safer assets. There is also tremendous pressure from hedge funds to reduce their risk. These hedge funds will likely be accelerating their selling as investors begin to give redemption notices.

Second, many of the troubled assets are remarkably complicated. The complexity is often a result of derivative features. While RTC mainly had to dispose of real estate, the new RTC will have to deal with assets that are far less straightforward.
If we want to get our system back on track, we must be thinking proactively – rather than initiating ad hoc solutions to extinguish the fire of the day. It is well known that if the credit problem is not solved there will be serious consequences for the real economy. These consequences include continued depreciation of home prices, negative job growth, and sluggish capital spending.

The following are my proposals.

1. Troubled Assets

a). TARP should not pay “hold to maturity” prices for the assets they purchase as recently suggested by the Federal Reserve Chairman in his Congressional Testimony. The hold to maturity prices for most assets are unrealistic and an awkward (or inefficient) subsidy to financial institutions. In addition, it is infuriating to average Americans that the government proposes to pay high prices for assets of little value.

I believe that a fundamental change in the approach is necessary. It is true that some of the most illiquid assets need to be removed from the balance sheets of financial institutions. A superior approach is to run the valuation models for the securities with a 3-5 year window that makes the assumption that markets will recover in the third year. Hence, purchasing at these prices will help financial institutions (because the price is above the current market price). The price is also a “fair price” for the Treasury given that it is based on their prospective holding period and their belief in a recovery. This would ensure that the Treasury will make a positive return on the investment. This plan ensures both the sellers get a good price and the taxpayers get a fair return.

The reason the above proposal works has to do with the liquidity premium. This premium differs depending on your holding period. If I have to sell my house by 5pm today, I will have to take a huge discount and sell it for, say $50,000. If my holding period were 3-6 months, I could sell it for much more – even in a tough housing market. The Treasury has a longer holding period. They should pay fair value reflecting that holding period – and a lower liquidity premium.

b). Under the current proposal, the management of TARP will outsourced to private managers. This is a mistake. Managers should be recruited to a new division of the Treasury to manage the TARP. There are too many conflicts of interest that arise when TARP is subcontracted out. Furthermore, with the recent restructuring in the industry, there should be plenty of talent to recruit. The Treasury would probably need
to buy some modeling expertise. Any government program should begin to unwind in five years and expire in seven years.

2. Direct equity injections to banks

Another problem with the TARP proposal is that TARP mixes the purchasing of troubled assets and equity investment. The current TARP proposal involves some equity compensation for TARP in the form of preferred stock.

The TARP proposal would take months to execute. It involves the valuation of very complex assets. We need a policy that provides immediate liquidity to the banking system. A policy like paying interest on reserve deposits helps but it is not enough.

a) Establish a Bank Capitalization Fund (BCF). There are two prongs necessary to get credit markets running again – the removal of illiquid assets from banks’ balances sheets and restoring confidence so that banks are willing to make loans. Bebchuk (2008) has eloquently made the point that it is crucial to separate the buying of distressed assets and from bank capital injections. These should be separate policy initiatives. While TARP will strengthen banks’ balance sheets, it is not an initiative designed to increase loans. In contrast, the BCF is targeted to directly improve the credit conditions. BCF should buy at least 2% of each bank’s equity. Banks would have the choice of taking the BCF investment or privately raising the equity. The equity investment would be mandated for all financial institutions. Obviously, those banks that are already insolvent would be relegated to the RTC rather than the BCF. Importantly, BCF could be implemented and executed within weeks. TARP will take considerably longer to set up.

b). The first RTC cost tax payers more than $200 billion. RTC was designed to dispose of failed assets. BCF and TARP are designed to minimize the number of failures and to effectively minimize taxpayer cost and the work of the RTC. I estimate that $300b is necessary in to fund the BCF. Taxpayers should expect a positive return on this investment. The cash from this injection should feed through to the real economy as banks use that capital for loan creation.

c). After two years, banks would be able to buy back the BCF investment. BCF would be terminated in October 2013. At that point, it would be mandatory for banks to buy back the BCF investment or BCF would feel free to dispose of the investment to other buyers.

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§ The 2% mandate is proposed by Diamond et al. (2008).
3. FDIC
a). The FDIC should be recapitalized sooner rather than later. We face a significant number of bank failures that could easily exhaust the FDIC funding. While the FDIC dodged the bullet with Washington Mutual’s failure, it is best to have the funding in place for the inevitable surge in bank failures. Here is an opportunity for policymakers to get in front of a problem, unlike what the Fed and Treasury have done with Bear, Fannie, Freddie, AIG, WaMu, which have been mostly ad hoc/reactive actions. The recapitalization will also instill extra confidence among the depositors and reduce the probability of bank runs.

b). Immediately increase the FDIC limit to $300,000. This will greatly reduce the chance of a bank run by customers with more than $100,000 in deposits. While there are not many of these large customers, the effect of their withdrawals is identical to thousands of smaller customers running on the bank.

4. Federal Reserve/Treasury
a). Mechanism should be in place to have a contingency plan for 750-1,000 bank failures over the next six months. This involves aggressive hiring and training of new staff now to deal with the future surge in failures. Hopefully, we will not need all the staff – but given the recent hard lessons of risk management, we need to be prepared.

b). Re-establish the Resolution Trust and fund it now. Given the predicted surge in bank failures, we need a system in place to deal with the problems quickly. In the past, the RTC was successful in disposing of assets of failed S&Ls and it is best to plan ahead for its inevitable redeployment. There are only so many times you can call on JP Morgan, Citibank and Bank of America.

5. The Real Economy
The availability of credit does impact the real economy – but only indirectly. The current disruption of credit markets will surely have a negative impact on jobs, capital spending and housing prices. We also need to proactively think about how to minimize the negative effects on the real economy.

a). The nationalization of Fannie and Freddie should reduce mortgage rates. However, that is not sufficient because (1) you need a bank to lend to you at the lower rate and (2) some people are ‘stuck’ in their houses
because they have negative equity (the mortgages are worth more than their properties). It is well known that it is very costly for banks to foreclose. The bank does not want to force a sale in our current housing environment. In addition, foreclosure firesales have a negative effect on the values of other houses in the surrounding neighborhood – and reduces the value of other mortgages in the bank portfolio. While I think it would be a bad idea for the government to force a reset of the principal amount of these mortgages, there could be ways to jump start the process. First, the bank has a natural incentive to reset (or cram-down) some of the principal. I propose that certain loans should qualify for a government incented program where the mortgage principal is reset to reflect market conditions with the government assuming 50% of the reset adjustment. The bank (and government indirectly) will hold an option on the difference between the original loan amount and the reset principal. This ensures some recovery if the house is sold for more than the reset amount.**

b) Two year moratorium on all pre-payment penalties for mortgages.

c) There has been no attention paid to non-financials. Let us not forgot that there are many highly leveraged industries such as the automobile manufacturing and the air transport. Ford alone has $166 billion in debt. It is highly likely that some of the problems we have seen in the financial sector could spill over into the non-financial sector. We want to avoid expensive government bailouts that occur after the problem reaches a crisis. Instead, prophylactic measures should be directed at some of the industries at highest risk. For example, the government might incent banks to provide lines of credit for some of these firms most at risk. That is, for banks participating in the TARP, there must be some explicit *quid pro quo*. This should apply not just to large companies but to small and medium sized companies. The engine of growth in our economy is small and medium sized businesses.

**Summary**

Over the past year, we have bounced from one problem to the next. It is time to develop a comprehensive and proactive set of policies. These policies will greatly reduce the chance of severe damage to the real economy and contribute to increased confidence in our financial institutions.

** One important feature of the option is that the difference between the reset and the original loan amount would be adjusted through time to reflect general level of inflation.
The proposed TARP is insufficient. We need a more comprehensive initiative that focuses on all key drivers of the real economy.

1. Treasury should not pay “hold to maturity” prices for troubled assets. The price should be set in between the firesale and hold to maturity. This insures a fair price for both the government and the financial institution.

2. Establish a Bank Capitalization Fund (BCF) with the goal of purchasing amount equity of all viable financial institutions. This equity injection can be done quickly and will immediately impact the availability of loans.

3. Immediately fund the BCF investment fund with $200-$300 billion.

4. BCF should expire in seven years.

5. Management of any government purchase of troubled assets should not be outsourced.

6. Recapitalize the FDIC both in anticipation of future failures and to instill confidence among depositors.

7. Immediately increase the FDIC maximum insured amount to $300,000 to reduce the chance of bank runs by large depositors.

8. Fed/Treasury needs to quickly put in place the staff to handle 750-1,000 bank failures.

9. Reestablish the Resolution Trust Corporation. This entity is mandated to dispose of assets of failed financial institutions.

10. Government incented principal resets of mortgages. Resets determined by banks and both have the option to recover some of the reset if house price appreciates.

11. Two year moratorium on mortgage prepayment penalties.

12. Explicit quid pro quo for banks participating in TARP that credit should not be cut off from non-financial companies, particularly, small and medium sized companies that are the engine of growth and jobs in our economy.

References: